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In this paper I test two models of strategic debt behavior. The general idea is that
if a government anticipates the possibility of defeat in the next election it will try to
use the debt strategically in order to influence the policy of its successor. Previous
empirical studies have either rejected the strategic explanation of debt or have not
been able to isolate this effect. I argue that these findings are perhaps less surprising
since there are several potential difficulties using U.S. or  OECD data to test the
strategic explanation. One problem with the U.S. data is the scarcity of degrees of
freedom while a problem with the OECD data is the pooling assumption. To come to
grips with these two problems I use a data set from Swedish local governments. The
main advantages of this panel data set are the homogeneity of the sample and the large
number of observations from elections, nearly 2000. After controlling for other
possible economic and demographic determinants of debt behavior, the main findings
of this paper strongly suggest that a right-wing government accumulates more debt
during its term of office if it thinks that it will be defeated as compared to when it
expects to remain in office. On the other hand, a left-wing government decreases the
level of debt the higher the possibility of its defeat. Moreover, the larger the inherited
debt the more a newly elected government has to reduce spending and raise taxes.
These results are consistent with the predictions from a model developed by Persson
and Svensson (1989).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last 20 years many countries have accumulated large government debts.
Several explanations of this stylized fact have been put forward. Some stress
economic reasons while others use political economy arguments.1 This paper will
explore one of the political economy explanations.
The idea is that the stock of debt links past policies to future policies. The current
policymaker can affect the state of the world inherited by his successors through his
choice of fiscal policy. If the government anticipates the possibility of defeat in the
next election it can use the debt strategically in order to influence the policy of its
successor. In other words, one can look upon debt as a commitment device in a
political game between current and future governments, where future tax revenues are
committed to debt service. In this paper, I will examine this hypothesis empirically.
To the best of my knowledge, there are only four empirical studies of the strategic
use of debt, Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991), Crain and Tollison (1993),
Lambertini (1996), and Franzese (1998).  Grilli et al. (1991) using data from a sample
of the OECD countries find that short government durability plays a crucial role in
explaining public borrowing. However, this study cannot discriminate if this is due to
strategic reason or to government weakness, meaning that public debt is a residual
source of finance, which simply reflects a government’s inability to cut expenditures
or raise taxes. Crain and Tollison (1993) conduct their empirical analysis on U.S.
States and their results indicate that party stability in the legislature over time is
correlated with less volatility of budget deficits/surpluses. They interpret this finding
as consistent with strategic debt behavior, but it is not obvious that this is the right
conclusion to draw since there are two competing strategic debt models and only one
of them necessarily predict less volatility.2 Nevertheless, Crain and Tollison’s (1993)
study is at best an indirect test of strategic debt behavior. The third study by
Lambertini with  OECD and U.S. data finds no evidence of strategic use of debt.
Instead, she argues that debt accumulation is due to capital market imperfections. She
                                                
1 See Alesina and Perotti (1995) for a survey of political economy models of budget deficits.
2 It is only from Persson and Svensson’s (1989) model that this statement follows. In Alesina and
Tabellini’s (1990) model, however, this is not necessarily true.3
shows that a deficit could arise if a majority of individuals are prevented from
borrowing. Finally, the fourth study by Franzese (1998) is also unable to find any
effects of strategic debt behavior on a panel of OECD countries.
Grilli et al. (1991), Lambertini (1996), and Franzese’s (1998) findings are perhaps
less surprising since there are several potential difficulties using U.S. or OECD data to
test the strategic explanation. U.S. data (the Federal level) contains very few
observations from elections, so there is a serious lack of degrees of freedom.3
However, with  OECD panel data there could be a problem with the pooling
assumption, that is, that the  OECD countries are too heterogeneous to be pooled
together.
Two examples of the problems with too much heterogeneity might help to clarify
this last point. A test of strategic debt behavior requires data on the incumbent’s
expectation of electoral defeat. Since we cannot observe expectations, we have to rely
on proxy variables. Thus, one problem concerns how to get comparable measures of
these proxies. This is not an easy task since the OECD countries differ, among other
things, with respect to electoral system, i.e., presidential or parliamentary, and type of
election, i.e., election occurrence is fixed or flexible.4
The second example concerns the exercise of constructing primary deficits free of
the effects of the business cycle variations. This exercise is of great importance, since
one needs to separate the business cycle component from the strategic component (if
there is one), to assess the role of strategic debt behavior. The more the countries of
the sample differ from each other the more difficult is the exercise, since one has to
take a stand on the benchmark value of the macroeconomic environment against
                                                
3 There is another problem with U.S. data to infer if there is a strategic debt behavior. The
problem concerns who control the budget process. Lambertini assumes that the president has the power
to control the budget, and not the Congress. This assumption might be questionable. See Kiewiet and
McCubbins (1991).
4 Both theories that are tested in this paper have the explicit assumption of fixed election calendar.
For member OECD nations, only in Sweden, Norway, Switzerland and U.S. are the calendar fixed. If
the calendar is flexible and one tries to investigate strategic debt behavior, one has the additional
incentive of opportunistic election timing to take care of.4
which the cyclical adjustment is defined and different countries are likely to have
different macroeconomic environments.5
To come to grips with these problems this paper makes use of a panel data set
from Swedish local governments. The main advantages of this panel data set are the
homogeneity of the sample, i.e., same political system, elections held at fixed intervals
of time, highly comparable measures of debt etc., and the large number of
observations from elections, nearly 2000.
Furthermore, this paper tries to make a direct test of strategic debt behavior by
generating predictors of the expectation of electoral defeat from an auxiliary model
and by discriminating between two theories of strategic debt behavior; Alesina and
Tabellini (1990), and Persson and Svensson (1989).
After controlling for other possible economic and demographic determinants of
debt behavior, the main findings of this paper strongly suggest that a right-wing
government accumulates more debt during its term of office if it thinks that it will be
defeated as compared to when it expects to remain in office. On the other hand, a left-
wing government decreases the level of debt the higher the possibility of its defeat.
These results are consistent with a strategic debt model developed by Persson and
Svensson (1989). According to their model, the inherited debt should affect a newly
elected government’s decision on taxation and spending. The evidence from this paper
shows that this is indeed the case. A high debt forces the new government to decrease
spending and raise taxes.
A reader with no prior knowledge of the general Swedish governing system, and
the relationship between the state and local governments in particular, might raise the
natural question as to whether local governments have any freedom of action of their
own. My reading of the literature on this issue is that local governments have a large
degree of autonomy.6
At this stage, a short description of local governments and their relationship to the
state might be helpful. Local governments are the most decentralized level of
government in Sweden and they constitute a very large fraction of the total
                                                
5 See Perotti (1997) for a discussion of cyclical adjustments of fiscal variables.
6 For an overview of Swedish local governments and a comparison with local governments in the
U.S. and Great Britain, see Gramlich and Ysander (1985).5
government sector in Sweden.7 They primarily finance their expenditure through a
local income tax (55 percent of the total income), and each local government is free to
independently adjust its tax.8 Other important income sources are user fees (16 percent
of the total income), and intergovernmental grants (22 percent of the total income).
Education, childcare and the care of the elderly are the main expenditure programs.
Local governments are required by national law to provide these programs.9 However,
the amount to be spent on each compulsory program is optional as long as it is
provided. There is also prescribed by national law that local governments balance their
budgets. This requirement has been rather ineffective since balanced budgets are only
a prospective or beginning of year balance.10 To conclude, I find that Swedish local
governments meet the required autonomy so that strategic debt theories are applicable.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section, I give a
short and non-technical presentation of two theories of strategic debt behavior.
Furthermore, I discuss the measures of the expectation of electoral defeat employed by
previous studies. The estimation method of the expected probability used in this paper
is also described. Section III outlines the empirical procedure and a discussion of the
data to which it is applied. Section IV and V presents the empirical results. I conclude
with a discussion of my findings.
II. TESTING TWO STRATEGIC EXPLANATIONS OF DEFICITS
                                                
7 The ratio of spending to GDP for the total government sector in Sweden is 60,6 percent in 1991,
while this ratio for local governments is 28 percent. This can be compared with U.S. numbers for 1990.
The ratio of total government spending to GDP is 33,7 percent, while the State/Local level ratio is 11.3
percent.
8 Local governments were temporarily deprived of this right between 1991 and 1993.
9 According to Ysander and Murray (1983), approximately 45 percent of local government’s total
expenditures are considered mandatory.
10 For an evaluation of the effect of balanced budget requirements on Swedish local governments,
see Ysander and Murray (1983) and Lane and Back (1991). The conclusion from their studies is similar
to the evidence from the U.S. Bohn and Inman (1996) conclude that beginning of year balanced budget
requirement is not an effective constraint on state deficits behavior.6
A. Models
There are several political economy explanations of the recent accumulation of
government debt in industrialized countries. In this paper, I will concentrate on two
models,  Alesina and  Tabellini (1990), and  Persson and  Svensson (1989), both of
which emphasize strategic considerations in the making of debt policy. In these
models, governments with different preferences alternate in office.
Alesina and Tabellini (1990) assume that the governments differ with respect to
their preferences about the composition of government spending. For example,
consider a government who wants to spend a lot on defense and little on welfare, and
assume that it knows that it is going to be replaced by another government who has
the opposite preference. The current government then realizes that defense spending
will be cut in the future anyway so it borrows a lot now because the marginal cost of
repaying the extra dollar of debt will fall on welfare which it cares little about. In other
words, a deficit bias will emerge because the government who borrows faces an
asymmetry. When the policymaker borrows he can spend the extra sources in the way
he wants but uncertainty about who will be appointed in the future prevents the
current policymaker from fully internalizing the future costs of the spending cuts.
In Persson and Svensson (1989), however, the level of government spending is
questionable. They consider a conservative government and a liberal or a left-wing
government. The conservative government wants a lower amount of spending than the
liberal. Suppose that the conservative government is certain to be replaced by its
opponent in the next election. Then the conservative government faces a trade off
between  distortionary taxes and debt.11 By lowering taxes and issuing debt, the
conservative government constrains future spending. However this creates a
suboptimal distribution of tax distortions since the taxes today are too low, which
implies that future taxes are going to be too high when the debt becomes due. If the
conservative government puts more weight on reaching its preferred level of spending
than on the welfare cost of a distorted tax profile over time,12 it will issue more debt
than the successor would prefer. On the other hand, the left wing government has
                                                
11 Persson and Svensson (1989) assume that the only way to raise money for government spending
is through a distortionary tax.
12 Persson and Svensson (1989) refer to this as stubbornness.7
exactly the opposite incentive. By raising taxes and reducing debt it creates surpluses
to encourage increases in future spending decisions.
To sum up, these two models have different empirical implications concerning
debt. Alesina and Tabellini (1990) predict that there is a deficit bias irrespective of the
incumbent’s political ideology, while Persson and Svensson (1989) predict that only
the right-wing government should issue debt. Instead, the left-wing government
should leave a surplus. Nevertheless, both models predict that the strategic use of
deficits or surpluses are larger, the greater the disagreement between different
policymakers and the more likely that the current government will be replaced.13
Accordingly, we should expect an incumbent with a high probability of defeat in the
next election to create facts for its successor by issuing or reducing debt. Thus, debt
policy should among other things be a function of the incumbent’s probability of
defeat. More formally,
(1) DEBT14 = a + bP + Xg + u
where P is the probability of defeat and X is a vector of variables affecting the level of
debt and u is an error term. Since the predictions differ between the two strategic debt
models, I need to discriminate between them. Thus, equation (1) is separated in two
cases, depending on the ideological preferences of the incumbent. Hence I rewrite (1)
as
(2) DEBT= ai + bi P + X g i + u
i ˛ L, R
                                                
13 Although Persson and Svensson (1989) assume no uncertainty of re-election, Lambertini (1996)
makes a formal extension and derives this result.
14 There is an issue whether the theories are about the level of debt or about deficits. In a two
period model, with no initial debt, there is no distinction between these two, but in a multi-period model
there is a difference. If we include the lagged level of debt in X, we can rewrite (1) as
DEBTt-DEBTt-1=a + qDEBTt-1 + bP + Xg + u. Thus, this equation can be interpreted in terms of
deficits. The regressor DEBTt-1 can be thought of as a control for the burden of the interest payment on
the outstanding debt.8
where the subscripts  L and  R stand for left-wing and right-wing incumbents
respectively. One way of comparing these two equations is to use a dummy variable
approach. Let DL be one if there is a left wing incumbent and zero otherwise. Thus I
rewrite (2) as
(3) DEBT= a1 + a2DL + b1P + b2 DL P + X g + DL X µ + u
The introduction of the dummy variable enables us to differentiate between the
intercepts and slope coefficients of the two groups. Thus, a2 should be interpreted as
the difference between the intercepts, and b2 and µ as the difference between the slope
coefficients. 15
With equation (3), we can test the different hypotheses from the two models.
Alesina and Tabellini (1990) predict that the incumbent should issue debt irrespective
of its political ideology when there is a high probability of defeat. Thus, their
hypothesis is that b1>0 (￿bR>0) and b2=0 (￿ bR=bL, i.e., both types of governments
have the same positive slope coefficient). On the other hand, Persson and Svensson
(1989) predict that a right-wing government has a larger incentive to borrow than a
left-wing government. Thus, their hypothesis is that b1>0 but that b2<0 (￿ bR>bL).
The sign of bL (bL=b1+b2) could be positive or negative depending on the stubborness
of the left-wing government.16
B. Electoral System
An ideal testing ground for the strategic debt models would be a country with a
two-party system where the parties only have unidimensional preferences along some
issue space (i.e., the composition or the level of government spending). Since some
countries are closer to this ideal than others we would like to perform our test on those
which more or less meet this ideal. Despite the fact that the Swedish electoral system
is based on proportional representation, I find it reasonable to make the approximation
                                                
15 Formally, one can show from Persson and Svensson’s model that left and right wing incumbents
could have different slope coefficients of X, i.e., m „0.
16 Stubborness refers to the weight the government attaches to reaching its preferred level of
government consumption relatively to the welfare cost of a distorted tax profile over time. A negative
sign of the coefficient bL would implicate a stubborn left-wing government. For further details see
Persson and Svensson (1989).9
as if it were a two-party system since there has traditionally been two main opposing
party blocs, the socialist and the non-socialist bloc.17 Unfortunately, at the local level,
there are several small parties not included in these two blocs and sometimes these
parties hold the balance of power. I call these kinds of constellations undefined
blocs.18 These undefined blocs create a problem because there is no general
information about the constellation of parties this bloc is constituted of. This makes it
impossible to use the predictions of the strategic debt theories, since these are based
on assumptions about the incumbent’s preferences (the level or the composition of
spending). Due to this fact, I delete those observations from the analysis.19
C. Empirical Measures of the Probability of defeat
An empirical test of strategic use of debt requires data on the incumbent’s
expectation to be defeated. But since we cannot observe the incumbent’s expectation
we have to rely on proxy variables.
Lambertini (1996) uses two different proxies of expectations. One proxy is
constructed from opinion polls in the U.S. More precisely, the percentages reported in
the Presidential Trial and Heats published in the Gallop’s Polls are used as a proxy of
expectation. The other one is based on a postulated relationship between a set of
economic variables and individuals’ voting decision for the OECD countries. Here it
is assumed that the voting decision is based on the change in real GDP per capita, real
GDP growth rate, and the change in the unemployment rate.
Grilli et al. (1991) construct a proxy from the total number of government
changes, those that results in transfer of power from one party to another. Their
hypothesis is that the higher the frequency of government changes, the higher is the
accumulation of debt. However, by using the frequency of government changes they
                                                
17 The socialist bloc includes the Leftist Party and the Social Democratic Party. The non-socialist
bloc includes three parties: the Conservative Party, the Centrist Party and the Liberal Party, from 1974
until 1988. Since 1988 it includes a fourth party: the Christian Democratic Party. In 1991 there was a
fifth part included in the non-socialist bloc: the New Democratic Party, but it was excluded in the 1994
election.
18 This classification is compiled from the distribution of seats in local councils. If either of the
blocs receive more than 50 percent of the seats it is defined accordingly, otherwise it is an undefined
bloc.10
implicitly assume that the incumbent’s respond in same way, i.e., the incumbent is
issuing debt irrespective of its political inclination. This assumption might be wrong
since Persson and Svensson’s model predicts that left-wing governments could reduce
the level of debt.
Crain and Tollision (1993) construct their proxy as a z-statistic, i.e., the absolute
value of the mean share of seats held by Democrats minus 50 percent, divided by the
standard deviation in Democrat’s share. The probability of no regime change is then
obtained from the cumulative normal distribution.
Franzese (1998) constructs his proxy as the inverse of the actual duration of the
incumbent government times a measure of the expected ideological distance between
the incumbent government and a future opponent.
In summary, there has been several ways of measuring the probability of electoral
defeat. In this paper I am going to use an approach that deals with the unobservable
variable problem from the  econometricians point of view.20 The basic idea is to
specify an auxiliary equation that links the unobservable variable to a set of
explanatory variables. More formally,
(4)  P* = P + h = Ww + h
where P is the expectation of defeat (unobservable), W is some variables describing
the formation of expectations, P* is the actual election outcome and h is an error term.
Pagan (1984) shows that an instrumental variable estimator applied to (3), with
the predicted values of P* as an instrument for P, will give a consistent estimator of
the standard errors.21 The remainder of this section describes the estimation procedure
of equation (4).22
                                                                                                                                    
19 I had to delete 309 observations.
20 The unobservable variable problem is equivalent (in this case) to an error-in-variables problem,
i.e.; one of the explanatory variables is correlated with the error term because it is an error-ridden
variable.
21 An added advantage of this method is that deals with a potential endogenity problem. One
could argue Aghion and Bolton (1990), and Persson and Tabellini (1997), that the level of debt could
be used strategically to influence the election outcome. If this is the case, this will make the error term11
The actual outcome from elections P* is a dichotomous variable, P* is either zero
or one. Since there are two different incumbents, left or right wing governments, and
either of these incumbents could have been defeated or not, there are four distinct
cases. Table 1 shows the different cases.
TABLE I
INCUMBENT GOVERNMENTS
Left-wing incumbent Right-wing incumbent
Change of power,      P*=1 107 192
No change of power, P*=0  710 621
Total sum S 817 S 813
From Table I, we can see that the total number of government changes are 299
during the sample period, 1974-1994. 23  In 107 cases a left-wing incumbent and in
192 cases a right-wing incumbent lost its power. Thus the relative frequency of
government changes for each group is 13 percent and 24 percent respectively.
Table II shows the frequency of government changes in each of 277
municipalities included in the sample.24  During the sample period, there was no
change of power in 117 municipalities. Of these, 69 had left-wing governments and 46
had right-wing governments.
TABLE II
THE FREQUENCY OF GOVERNMENT CHANGES
a
1974-1994




117 29 42 38 30 12 9 0
a. In this table I have also included the observations from the undefined bloc.
                                                                                                                                    
and the regressor P in equation (3) correlated. Thus, the solution to this potential endogeneity problem
calls for an instrumental variable framework.
22 In an earlier version of my paper, I tried several other methods of estimating the probability of
defeat and reaching qualitatively similar results. I believe the results I report are robust to the estimation
procedure of the probability of electoral defeat.
23 At parliamentary and municipal council elections, voters in Sweden vote for a political party
every third year. These elections are held at the same point in time. The first election was held in 1976.
24 Since there are seven elections during this period, the maximum number of changes of power is
7.12
To estimate equation (4) we need to find the variables W describing the formation
of expectations of electoral defeat. A prerequisite is that the variables are
predetermined. One predetermined variable that could be used to predict the election
outcome is the share of seats that the legislative majority received in the previous
election. This variable can be taken as a fairly good indicator of the incumbent’s
electoral uncertainty in the pending election. Apart from the share of seats I also
include fixed effects, both municipal and time specific effects.25 Individual effects are
introduced to control for the heterogeneity in the degree of government stability. We
can see from Table II that the frequency of government changes is unequally dispersed
among the different municipalities. Time effects are included to control for variables
that may have common effect on the municipalities in a given year, such as the effect
from the business cycle, changes in preferences of the electorate, etc. Equation (4) is
estimated with a Probit model, i.e. Pr(P* =1)=F (Ww), where F (￿) is the standard
cumulative function.26
Table III provides the results from the estimation of the probability of defeat
based on the Probit model. The coefficient of the share of seats in the last election is
highly significant. To interpret the effect of a change in the share of seats on the
probability of defeat, we calculate it at its mean value. Thus, for a one-percent
increase in the share of seats the probability of defeat will decrease with 8.5 percent.
The model predicts 93 percent of the observations correctly. The correlation between
the actual outcome from election P* and the predicted values from the Probit model is
                                                
25 Potentially, information from opinion polls could also be used as an explanatory variable, but in
Sweden there are only opinion polls at the national level. I have also tried economic variables, such as
the growth of income, at the municipality level. These variables do not help us to predict the election
outcome.
26 I have used a fixed effect probit model, although it does not lend itself well to fixed effect
treatment. I have also tried the random specification developed by Butler and Moffitt (1982), but this
specification gives much worse predictions than the fixed effect. Since I am mainly interested in the
predictions from the model I choose the fixed effect specification. However, I also tried to use the
predictions from the random effect specification in the subsequent analysis and found qualitatively
similar results.13
0.81. Thus, we have a very high correlation between the instrument and the actual
election result.
TABLE III
ESTIMATION OF THE PROBABILITY OF DEFEAT
(z-STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES)
Explanatory variables Probit model
Share of seats in the last election -0.28
(-7.11)
Pseudo R
2 (Likelihood ratio index) 0.47
The regression include year and municipality effects14
III. EMPIRICAL PROCEDURE AND DATA
A large pooled time-series cross-section data set is used. The sample period is
from 1974 to 1994 and 277 municipalities have been included in the sample.27 The
dependent variable is public debt measured in per capita terms and at constant
prices.28 There are several measures of debt in the official financial position of
municipalities but I have chosen to work with short and long-term debt not including
social security liabilities.29 I made this choice so as to have a comparable measure of
debt during the sample period.30 To capture any possible effect of strategic use of
debt, I control for the inherited debt from the previous election. The rationale for this
is that the inherited debt can constrain the incumbent policymaker from pursuing his
preferred debt policy during his term of office. Thus, I can reformulate the basic
regression equation (3) as
(6) DEBTit=a1+a2DL+b1Pit+b2DLPit+d1DEBTit-3+d2DLDEBTit-3+Xitg+DLXit m + uit
i = 1,...,277
t = 76, 79, 82, 85, 88, 91 and 94
with i denoting municipalities and t denoting election years.
                                                
27 For a full description of the data used in the analysis, see Appendix 1. Due to amalgamations of
municipalities, it is not possible to go further back than 1974. At the beginning of 1974 there existed
278 municipalities.
28 I have used the implicit GDP deflator, expressed in 1991 values. The deflator is constructed by
taking the ratio of GDP at current market prices to GDP at fixed market prices. I have also used two
other deflators, CPI and a municipality-specific price index, but the results are very similar.
29 Long-term debts are defined as debts with a maturity of 1 year or longer, while short term debts
have a maturity of up to 1 year. Data on social security liabilities are only available from 1988.
30 There is one exception; temporary loans are counted twice in 1988, but only half of the
municipalities make use of temporary loans and usually they are small in number.15
There are, of course, other variables affecting the level of debt apart from the
probability of defeat and the inherited debt. To take this into account and avoid
omitted variable bias I have to control for those variables. But which variables should
be included in the X vector of equation (4)? The strategic debt theories do not provide
much guidance and there is still no consensus concerning the process that generates
government spending decisions.31 However, there are usually some economic and
demographic factors included in the estimation of a jurisdiction spending decision and
therefore I will also try to control for similar factors.
The main expenditures of Swedish municipalities are education, childcare and the
care of the elderly. Therefore, these expenditures fall more heavily on municipalities
with a large fraction of young or elderly people. Thus, I control for the share of young
people (0-19) and the share of people older than 65. The main parts of revenues come
from a proportional local income tax and since there are differences in the tax base,
which could have an impact on the ability to raise tax revenues, I include it as a
control.32 The tax base could also be seen as a control for business cycle variations
since it possibly picks up business cycle fluctuations. I also include population size as
a control variable. Population size captures the possibility that there are potentially
congestion effects or scale economies in the provision of local government services.
Finally, I include “time effects”. Time effects are primarily used to control for
variables that may have common effect on the municipalities in a given year, such as
the effect from the business cycle, changes in preferences of the electorate, etc.
Including time effects is particularly important in the context of my problem, because
I do not want to attribute behavioral significance to any across-municipalities
correlation in debts that are really due to common national influences. Table IV
provides mean and standard deviations of the variables in my analysis.
                                                
31 See Inman (1988) for a survey of various model of government expenditure determination.
32 The tax base at time t is measured as the total taxable income from individuals living in the
municipality according to the tax assessment in t-1.16
TABLE IV






Debt 1623 10182 4749
Income tax base 1630 60352 12993
Population 1630 28562 46763
Proportion of elderly
(65+)
c 1630 17.54 4.31
Proportion of young
(0-19)







a. Debt and income tax base is per capita in 1991 SEK.
b. The full sample consists of 1939 observations, but observations where there has been an
undefined bloc in power prior to an election has been deleted.
c. Information on the proportion of elderly for 1974 and 1976 was only available for 67+.
d. Information on the proportion of young for 1974, 1976 and 1979 was only available for 0-17.17
IV. RESULTS
In this section I present empirical evidence of the strategic use of debt and check
the robustness of these results.33
A. Basic Results
Table V and VI shows the results of the effect of the probability of defeat on the
level of debt. Table V presents the results when I only control for the inherited debt
from the last election, while table VI shows the results when I use all the control
variables (including time effects).
In table V, the coefficient of DL is positive and statistically significant in both
regressions. This indicates that the socialist bloc has on average a higher level of debt
when there is no probability of defeat. A test of the strategic debt models is easily
carried out. The coefficient of P is positive and highly significant with t-values of 5.11
and 4.27.34 This strongly suggests that a non-socialist bloc accumulate more debt the
higher the possibility of defeat. For example, in the instrumental variable (IV) case, a
non-socialist incumbent increases, on average, the level of debt with 1418 SEK/capita
(which is roughly 14 percent of the total debt) when it is certain to be defeated
compared to when it is certain to remain in power. However, the coefficient of PDL is
negative and highly significant in both regressions.35 Hence this result strongly
suggests that the two blocs have different slope coefficients. For example, in the IV-
case, a socialist incumbent decreases, on average, the level of debt with 1160
SEK/capita (1418-2578) when it is certain to be defeated compared to when it is
certain to remain in power. Figure I plots the relationship between the level of debt
                                                
33 There have been several changes in the number of municipalities during this period. In 1974
there existed 278 municipalities and in 1994 there were a total of 286. For this reason, I repeated the
analysis excluding those municipalities, which have not existed, unchanged during the period. I find
virtually identical results. Hence, I focus throughout on results for the full sample.
34 I am using a one-sided test, i.e., b1>0 (null hypothesis b1=0) because this is the prediction from
both theories. For this test, the critical value at the 5 percent level is 1.65, and the critical value at the 1
percent level is 2.33.
35 Since I am trying to discriminate between the two theories, the alternative hypothesis is that
b1>b2 (with the null hypothesis b1=b2). Hence, I am using a one-sided t-test and the critical value at the
5 is 1.65, and the critical value at the 1 percent level is 2.33.18
and P when a1=aR is normalized to zero for the IV-case. This figure shows that a
socialist bloc who is certain to be defeated has the same level of debt compared to a
non-socialist bloc, which is certain to remain in power. Figure I also shows that a non-
socialist bloc, which is replaced with certainty, has a higher level of debt compared to
a socialist bloc, which is certain to stay in power.
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     aL=1156, bL=b1+ b2=-11.6
                                      P=0.5                            P=1
     aR=0, bR=b1=14.2                                           -4
FIGURE I
The effect of P on the level of debt19
TABLE V
THE IMPACT OF P ON THE LEVEL OF DEBT,
a
1974-1994
 (t-STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES)
Explanatory variables Actual election result
b  Instrumental variable
method
c






















Number of observations 1617 1617
*Statistically significant at the 5 percent level (the critical value for a one-sided hypothesis is 1.65)
** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level (the critical value for a one-sided hypothesis is 2.33)
a. See notes to table I for sample information.
All regressions are restricted to those municipalities, which have had a socialist or a non-socialist
bloc before an election.
All income tax bases and debt are per capita in 1991 SEK.
b. White standard errors were used in calculating t-statistics.
c. The probability of defeat is estimated from a panel probit regression with fixed effects, i.e.,
election resultit = m + gi + lt+ share of seatsit + eit, with i and t denoting municipalities and election
years respectively. The fitted probabilities are used as instruments for the actual election outcome.
These predicted probabilities have a correlation coefficient of 0.81 with actual changes of governments.20
In table VI, where I use all control variables, I get qualitatively similar results for
the coefficients of P and PDL as in table V. They are all statistically significant at least
at the 5 percent level (one-tail tests). In other words, all regressions are illustrating the
same principle, that is to say a socialist bloc, on average, reduces the level of debt
while a non-socialist bloc does the opposite the higher the probability of defeat.
The coefficients of the other variables in Table VI also need some comments. The
inherited debt, the population size and the proportion of elderly all seem to have a
positive and significant effect on the level of debt, while the tax base and the
proportion of young seem to have none. Furthermore, the value of the coefficient on
inherited debt, 0.74, indicates that the level of debt is a mean reverting process.36
There is also some support for that the two incumbents have different slope
coefficients since one of the interaction terms is significant, DL Tax base.37
B. Econometric Issues
There are some econometric issues when estimating equation (6). The first one
concerns a lagged dependent variable and the possibility of existence of municipality
specific effects. If there were municipal specific effects, the correlation between these
effects and lagged dependent variable would seriously bias the OLS estimator. The
estimator of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable would be biased upward,
and the coefficient of the exogenous variables would be biased toward zero, Trognon
(1978). I have therefore conducted the Lagrange multiplier test for random effects,
i.e., the null hypothesis that municipal specific effects do not exist. I cannot reject this
hypothesis at the 5 percent significance level for any of the regression models in Table
VI, when I am using all control variables. However, I have estimated the models in
Table V and Table VI via a random effects specification and I find virtually the same
results as presented in those Tables.
Another econometric issue concerns measurement error of the probability of
defeat P. If P is the only variable that is measured with an error then its coefficient is
biased toward zero, Green (1997). I have tried to deal with this problem through the
instrumental variable method suggested by Pagan (1984). We can make a test of no
                                                
36 I have not checked this statistically since the time series dimension only include 7 observations.
37 See footnote 15.21
measurement error (or equivalently  exogeneity of the  regressors) with a  Hausman
test.38 I cannot reject that there is no correlation between the error and the regressors,
P and DLP, in any of specifications in Table V or VI.
                                                
38 Hausman (1978)22
TABLE VI
THE IMPACT OF P ON THE LEVEL OF DEBT,
a
1974-1994
 (t-STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES)
Explanatory variables Actual election result
b  Instrumental variable
method
c






















































Number of observations 1617 1617
*Statistically significant at the 5 percent level (the critical value for a one-sided hypothesis is 1.65)
** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level (the critical value for a one-sided hypothesis is 2.33)
a.  See notes to table I for sample information.
All regressions are restricted to those municipalities, which have had a socialist or a non-socialist
bloc before an election.
All income tax bases and debt are per capita in 1991 SEK.
The regressions also include time effects.
b. White standard errors were used in calculating t-statistics.
c. The probability of defeat is estimated from a panel probit regression with fixed effects, i.e.,
election resultit = m + gi + lt+ share of seatsit + eit, with i and t denoting municipalities and election
years respectively. The fitted probabilities are used as instruments for the actual election outcome.
These predicted probabilities have a correlation coefficient of 0.81 with actual changes of governments.23
V. EXTENSIONS
My results seem to support the predictions from Persson and Svensson’s model.
However, this section makes some additional checks on the implications of their
model. I make two extensions. The first one is based on the notion that a high
frequency of government changes creates an over accumulation of debt. A rejection of
this hypothesis would give further support to Persson and Svensson’s model, since
this would be consistent with right-wing incumbents creating deficits while left-wing
incumbents creating surpluses when there is a change of power. The second extension
tests whether the inherited debt influences a newly elected government’s decision on
taxation and spending or not. The basic mechanism of Persson and Svensson’s model
rests on the assumption that the inherited debt has an impact on these decisions.
A. High Frequency of Government Changes
The main prediction from Alesina and Tabellini’s model is that countries with a
high frequency of government changes start to accumulate debt to a larger extent than
countries with a stable political leadership. This follow from that the incumbent
government has an initiative to issue more debt, when it expects not to be re-elected,
to influence the next governments choice of fiscal policy. Thus,  Alesina and
Tabellini’s model makes no behavioral distinction, regarding the strategic use of debt,
between incumbents with different ideological inclination.
To make an empirical assessment of this hypothesis I follow a similar approach to
that taken by Grilli et al.(1991). They construct a political variable, which takes higher
values as the frequency of government changes increases and define a government
change as a transfer of power from one leading group to another. Similarly, I define a
government change as a transfer of power between a socialist, a non-socialist or an
undefined bloc.39 During this period there has been a total number of seven elections,
thus the highest value of the political variable is seven and the lowest is zero. Table II
provides information about the political variable.
I use an estimation procedure similar to the one in the last section, except that I
now use average values for the economic and demographic explanatory variables, to
                                                
39 Now I include those municipalities, which have had an undefined bloc as incumbent prior to an
election.24
explain the accumulation of debt during 1974-1994. Thus, I estimate the following
cross section equation:
(5)  DEBTi94 = a + bFREQi + g1DEBTi74 +Xig + ui
where i stands for municipalities and the underbar denotes average values for the other
explanatory variables during 1974-1994.
Table VII provides the result from the regression. The result implies that the
frequency of government changes have no significant impact on the accumulation of
debt (the sign of the coefficient is also opposite from what would be expected). Thus,
this result confirms the previous findings that the two blocs have opposite incentives
regarding the strategic use of debt. Furthermore, it shows that it can be very
misleading to use the frequency of government changes to infer strategic debt
behavior.
TABLE VII




 (t-STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES)
Explanatory variables Dependent variable: Level of debt
1994
Frequency of government changes -77
(-0.49)






Proportion young (0-19) -380
(-1.58)




Number of observations 277
a. See notes to table I for sample information.
All income, tax base and debt are per capita in 1991 SEK.
White standard errors were used in calculating t-statistics.25
B. Influences of the Inherited Debt on Policy40
The model by Persson and Svensson rests, among other things, on the argument
that the inherited debt should influence a newly elected government’s decision on
taxation or spending. To investigate if this is the case I estimate the following
regressions
(6)  Expit+1 -Expit= a + b1
E DEBTit + b2
E
 DLDEBTit + uit
(7)  Taxit+1 -Taxit= a  + b1
TDEBTit + b2
T
 DLDEBTit + uit
i =1,...277
t = 76, 79, 82, 85, 88, 91 and 94
where  i stands for municipalities and  t for election years. Time effects are also
included in all regressions.
Before I proceed with the results, some comments on these empirical
specifications are necessary. If the inherited debt should cause any changes in policy
one would expect that it would happen within the next year after the election. Thus, I
look at the change in spending and taxes after one year.




E to be negative but the sign of b1
T and b1
T+b2
T to be positive since a larger
inherited debt would force the newly elected government to decrease spending or/and
increase taxes.
Table VIII reports results of the influences of the inherited debt on policy. The
results are in accord with Persson and Svensson’s model, i.e., a negative relationship
between inherited debt and change in spending and a positive relationship between
inherited debt and taxes.
Overall, the results of this section further strengthen the support for strategic
manipulations in the making of debt policies along the lines of  Persson and
Svensson’s model.
                                                
40 I am grateful to Eva Johansson for providing me with data on expenditures.26
TABLE VIII
INFLUENCES OF INHERITED DEBT ON EXPENDITURE AND TAXES
1976-1995
(t-STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES)




change in tax rates










Number of observations 1614 1623
*Statistically significant at the 5 percent level
** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
All regressions include a full set of time dummy variables.
All income, tax base and debt are per capita in 1991 SEK.
White standard errors were used in calculating t-statistics.27
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper principally posits that there are strategic considerations in the making
of the debt policies of local governments. My results strongly suggest that a right-wing
government accumulates more debt during its term of office if it thinks that it is going
to be defeated in the next election compared to when it expects to remain in office. On
the other hand, a left-wing government decreases the level of debt the higher the
probability of its defeat.
What are the possible objections to my findings? Some might argue that reversed
causality might provide an explanation, that is, that the level of debt could have an
impact on the election result.41 Yes, one could conclude that voters punish socialists
or conservatives depending on whether or not they are violating their campaign
pledges. If people vote for socialists when they want high spending and they vote for
conservatives when they want low spending, one could argue that socialists and
conservatives loose their respective elections because socialists spend too little while
conservatives spend too much. However, I have three objections to this explanation.
Firstly, I use an instrumental technique to take care of the  endogeneity problem.
Secondly, in my sample the effect of the level of debt on election outcomes is never
statistically significant.42 The third objection is that if this explanation is true, then this
story either imply that the incumbent is irrational, since he never learns that the voters
will punish him every time he breaks his campaign pledge, or that he does not care
about being re-elected.
Another objection to my findings could be that my results points to electoral
competition, that is if the policymaker has a desire to win the election and be re-
elected, he will try to increase his probability of re-election any way he can.43
However, this is inconsistent with my results because only the non-socialist
government increases its level of debt when the probability of defeat is high.
                                                
41 Francisco Rodriguez and Henry Ohlsson made this interpretation.
42 The results from the panel probit regression with election outcomes as the dependent variable
are available upon request. Peltzman (1992) and Alesina, Perotti, and Tavares (1997) come to the same
conclusion, that deficits have no significant impact on election outcomes.
43 See Barber and Sen (1986) for the use of debt financing as a means of increasing the likelihood
of electoral success.28
A third objection to my results could be that I treat the blocs, non-socialist and
socialist, as if they behave as a single decision-maker once in power. The socialist
bloc consists of two parties and the non-socialist bloc is made up of several parties,
thus, they are both coalition governments. There is empirical evidence that coalition
governments have larger budget deficits than majority governments, the deficit is
higher the larger the number of parties in the governing coalition.44 But my results
suggest that the socialist incumbent (the smaller coalition) increases the level of debt
compared to a non-socialist (the larger coalition) when they are both certain to be re-
elected. So this finding is inconsistent with the coalition explanation.
In conclusion, it seems that my empirical findings strongly favor the strategic
explanation of the use of debt.
                                                
44 Roubini and Sachs (1989). Edin and Ohlsson (1991) argue that minority governments, rather
than coalition governments, are associated with larger debt issue.29
APPENDIX 1
Data used in my analysis come from several sources. Data on debt are taken from
Kommunernas finanser 1974-1988 and Vad kostar verksamheten i din kommun 1988-
1994. Data on municipality population are taken from Årsbok för Sveriges kommuner
1974-1994. The proportion of elderly is a fraction of state population greater than or
equal to age 65, except for the years 1974 and 1976 when it is greater or equal to age
67. The proportion of young is the fraction of people between the ages of 0 and 19,
except for the years 1974, 1976 and 1979 when its between 0 and 17. Data on
elections are taken from Kommun aktuellt 1979-1994 and Kommunal tidskrift 1973-
1976. My data on income tax base are taken from Årsbok för Sveriges Kommuner and
Kommunernas finanser.30
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